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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This personal injury action arises from a Boise motor vehicle collision in 2004. At trial,
the jury found the defendant 100% liable, and that her negligence injured the plaintiff (Appellant
Anthony Harper). But then the jury awarded him no general damages at all, and only a small
fraction of his medical expenses.
This appeal challenges the validity of the verdict, and failure of the trial judge to grant a
new trial, additur or JNOV. It also challenges the failure to order that Dr. Harper be provided the
full Record of the trial at public expense.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.

The parties agree that in April 2004 young Ms. Seamons ran a red light, and T-

boned Dr. Harper's minivan in Boise.
2.

Although she ran the red light, Ms. Seamons never accepted full responsibility. 1

But the jury found that she was at fault, and that Dr. Harper had no fault.

1

Ms. Seamons' one and only suggestion, in testimony and in argument, for why she should not bear full
responsibility for the accident, was that we all should watch where we are going, so Dr. Harper should have
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3.

Dr. Harper suffered exacerbation of neck and back injuries, which is undisputed.

4.

He also suffered mild traumatic brain injury ("MTBI"), which was only partially

disputed (as to causation and severity) at trial.
5.

Dr. Harper filed the underlying lawsuit, seeking damages for injuries to his head,

neck, back, eye drooping, cognitive losses, hearing defects and more, and for the noneconomic
damages for all those injuries, such as pain, suffering, humiliation, stress, etc.
6.

The case was tried to a jury on September 27, 2010 through October 6, 2010 in

the Fourth District Court, Ada County Courthouse. ROA 8-10.
7.

At nearly the last minute, the trial judge was changed from the Honorable Richard

Greenwood, to Senior Judge Dennis Goff of Canyon County. The matter was tried before Judge
Goff. ROA 8.
8.

Defendant claimed that Dr. Harper's head injury symptoms were in part at least

unrelated to the crash.
9.

Concerning Dr. Harper's injuries, and their being caused by the collision, his

medical providers (Drs. Craig Beaver, Douglas Smith, Gregory Lewer, Gregory Ferch, Yong
Bing Shi and David Weinberg) testified uniformly that Dr. Harper had suffered injury.
10.

Even defendant's witnesses, Drs. Nancy Greenwald and Richard Wilson, agreed

that he had suffered a whiplash (sprain/strain) of the neck and back from the collision. Dr. Ferch
found objective radiological evidence of these back and neck injuries.
11.

Drs. Beaver, Lewer, Ferch and others opined that he suffered a head injury

(MTBI) due to the crash. Dr. Greenwald, hired by the defense, diagnosed MTB l as well, though
she did not state whether it was caused by the collision. Drs. Shi, Beaver, and Lewer found that
sequalae from the crash (and MTBI) included hyperacusis and tinnitus. Most of them testified

anticipated her running the light and avoided her. And, amazingly, this suggestion was given to the jury with a
straight face.
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that it also included short-term memory loss, dizziness, confusion, worsening of pre-existing
headaches, worsening of pre-existing back and neck pain, weakness, etc.
12.

Most testified (as did the surgeon, Dr. David Weinberg [video]), that it also

included damage to the seventh cranial nerve, with resultant sagging face and drooping eyelid,
necessitating the surgery performed on his face and eyelid.
13.

"Independent" medical examiner Dr. Wilson was equivocal concerning MTBI

causation. But as to the back and neck, he disagreed only on the likely recovery time. He simply
stated (as he usually does) that such injuries "normally" can be expected to heal up in 3 weeks to
3 months.

Concerning damages, the testimony by Dr. Harper's medical providers was

undisputed as to the neck and back injuries, and was also strong on the '\1TBI.
14.

Over objection, the jury heard evidence and saw exhibits that Dr. Harper's

counselor license was revoked, and the allegations behind it, which may have seemed to them to
be greed, duel relationship and overreaching.
15.

Further, again over objection, the jury heard video evidence, which Dr. Harper's

counsel had never been provided in advance (or even since), of Dr Harper being interviewed on a
Denver religious program.

The video included Dr. Harper criticizing homosexuals, and

portrayed him in a light which allowed the defense to argue to the jury that his symptoms were
magnified.
16.

Although assigned an exhibit number, 765, there was no record preserved of the

video shown to the jury, as clearly stated in the Clerk's Record. R. 361. And the exhibit list
indicates that the video was not admitted into evidence. Yet that phantom video (if it is to be
called such) was played for the jury.
17.

After those several days of trial, on October 7, 2011 the jury returned a special

verdict, finding defendant 100% liable for the collision.2

R. 258-60.

At the same time,

2

Despite the lack of any evidence of fault in the collision on the part of Dr. Harper, the defendant, Ms. Seamons,
never admitted sole liability.
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however, the juror awarded to Dr. Harper only $4,100.00 for economic damages (a fraction of
his medical bills). Id.; ROA 9.
18.

And the jury awarded zero for noneconomic damages, including pain and

suffering. R. 258-60; ROA 9.
19.

Judgment was entered on October 25, 2010, consistent with the verdict. 3 R. 255-

57; ROA 10.
20.

Dr. Harper timely moved for a new trial, JNOV or additur, with an extensive

Affidavit with attachments, and Memorandum. R. 261-33.
21.

Judge Goff denied these post-trial motions by a ten page Order of January 10,

2011, and Final Judgment dated February 7, 2011. R. 334-42; R. 354.
22.

Dr. Harper timely filed his Notice of Appeal on February 9, 2011. 4 R. 347-53.

An exemption/waiver as to riling fees and transcripts was claimed. Id. An Amended Notice of

Appeal was filed March 15,201 L R. 354-60.
23.

On February 9, 2011 Dr. Harper filed a ,Motion and Affidavit for

Waiver with

the trial court. RIA 10. See file stamped copy5 attached as Exhibit B to Appellant's Verified

Motion for Waiver of Costs, filed with this Court.

After the Court filed a Notice of

Correspondence (Id., Exhibit B), on February 18, 2011, Dr. Harper filed Plaintiff/Appellant's
Amended Motion and Affidavit for Fee Waiver. Id.; ROA 10. This document included his most
recent tax return. The motion for waiver was denied after a hearing. Judge Greenwood directed
that the transcript of the hearing serve as the Order, and no separate order was entered. That
3

Judge Goff entered the jury's verdict as a judgment for Dr. Harper in the amount of$4,100. He also granted costs
for defendant in the amount of$4,057.75. The offset of those figures resulted in a final judgment against defendant
in the amount of$42.25. Final Judgment.
4
In the Notice ofAppeal a full transcript of the trial was requested, as well as that of two pretrial hearings, pursuant
52.
to IAR 8. R. 347-52
5
It appears that the District Court Clerk may have failed to include the Affidavit and Amended Affidavit in the
Clerk's Record. However, the District Court Clerk's file stamp, on file with this Court, prove they were filed
timely.
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transcript was filed with the district court on March 30, 2011, ROA 11. On April 13, 2011 Dr.
Harper filed with this Court Appellant's Verified Motion for Waiver of Costs.
24.

The trial court made no findings, conclusions or written order in denying the

waiver. The court did not find that Mr. Harper either was or was not indigent.
25.

This Court denied the motion to waive costs on May 16, 2011, without hearing

and without explanation.
26.

Dr. Harper then managed to pay the filing fee and paid for the Clerk's Record.

He is impecunious, and unable to afford the trial transcript.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
In his Amended Notice of Appeal Dr. Harper included numerous appeal issues. None of
these is waived, but they are set forth more succinctly below, in compliance with the Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
1.

Was the verdict inconsistent and/or legally invalid on its face (or otherwise)?
Specifically, was it error to award damages for an injury, but to award no
damages for pain, suffering and other noneconomic harm from the same
injury?

2.

Was there substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict of very low award
of compensatory damages, and its award of zero general damages?

3.

Were the damages inadequate as a matter of law, evidencing Juror
misconduct, such as influence by passion or prejudice?

4.

Was the jury's verdict of very low compensatory damages, and zero general
damages, against the great weight of the evidence?
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5.

Was it error for the trial judge to deny plaintiff/appellant's motion for (a) new
trial, for (b) additur, or for (c) judgment notwithstanding the verdict?

6.

Was it error to exclude exhibits as a sanction for alleged failure to disclose or
produce them before trial, or on the basis of hearsay, or because those experts
testified at or before trial?

7.

Was it error to allow extensive testimony about Dr. Harper losing his
counselor's license, and other supposed bad acts or bad character evidence,
where the testimony more prejudicial than probative?

8.

Was evidence of opinions on homosexual or religious issues inadmissible as
more prejudicial than probative, and/or under the United States Constitution
or Idaho's Constitution.

9.

Was it error to allow a video to be played to the jury, which had (a) never
been seen by either the plaintiff/appellant nor the trial Judge, which (b)
contained inflammatory information? And (c) was it further error for the
defense and the trial court to not cause any record of the video to be preserved
for this Court to review. See, R. 361. And where the court's record shows
the video as not received into evidence, was it error to allow the defendant to
play it for the jury?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial evidence was uncontroverted that Dr. Harper experienced pain and suffering as
a result of injuries caused by the collision, and the jury found sole defendant liability. A verdict
awarding nothing for pain and suffering is unlawful, and cannot be countenanced, factually or
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legally.

Even the actual damages awarded, which were a fraction of those incurred, were

erroneous.
The trial court should have granted a new trial, an additur of additional damages, or
ordered a JNOV as to damages, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 50(b), 59(a)(l), 59(a)(2), 6 59(a)(5), 59(a)(6),
59(a)(7), and 59.1 and 60.
It was error to admit evidence never produced before trial, and not preserved as a part of

the Record. And it was error to exclude certain medical evidence.
Finally, Dr. Harper, who is indigent, should have been granted an exemption to payment
for trial and hearing transcripts.

ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court should have ordered that the Record, including trial

transcripts, be provided to Dr. Harper, based on his indigence. Although this concern is not

the prime issue, this argument is placed in first position in this Brief, because of its effect on the
ability to fully brief all of the issues. It is impossible to cite to the Record in many instances in
arguing the other issues on appeal, because the trial court (and, at least preliminarily, this Court),
have declined to require Ada County to prepare a transcript of trial. The inability to provide a
trial transcript should not be held against Dr. Harper.
For an unknown reason, inappropriately, the trial court clerk did not file the Application,
which was pro se, in the court's files. See, e.g., ROA 10. Nor did they return it. Instead, the
trial court sent a letter to Dr. Harper's undersigned counsel, requesting further information.
Accordingly, Plaintif]!Appellant's Amended Motion and Affidavit for Fee Waiver was filed on
February 18, 2011. Similarly, that document was not placed in the District Court's case file.
See, DOA 10. The docket simply skips both of those two documents. Nevertheless, both were
6

Jury misconduct is claimed only in that their verdict was apparently the result of passion or prejudice, which is
more specifically set forth in IRCP 59(a)(5).
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attached to the Motion for Fee Waiver submitted to this Court. The District Court's file stamp is
clearly visible on the face of those documents. IRCP 5 requires that parties file documents with
the clerk, which Dr. Harper did.

There may be some internal practice which led to these

documents not being filed, but it would not be consistent with the Rules. The clerk has no
discretion to reject or fail to file a document presented to it, especially when it has a proper
caption, case number, etc.
Motions for waiver of costs are granted on a rather routine basis, almost as a matter of
course, so long as the court form shows indigence. Here it did show as much. See, ROA 10.
Most of such forms are filed pro se, as one might expect. But nothing in the Rules prohibits the
granting of such a motion on the basis that one has an attorney.
Here, as required by IAR 23, Dr. Harper filed the Motion for Waiver simultaneously with
his Notice of Appeal. When the trial court indicated a unfavorable reception of the Motion, Dr.
Harper managed (with great difficulty) to pay the filing fee and, eventually, the cost of the
Clerk's Record on Appeal. However, he has been unable to pay for a transcript of the trial
(which was estimated by the court reporters to be about $7,500.
There are various rules that apply to waiver of costs and filing fees, but the one most
directly applicable here is IAR 24(±) & (h). It provides in part:
The payment of the report's fee as required by this rule may be waived by the
district court pursuant to Section 31-3220, Idaho Code, in accordance with the
local rules of the judicial district of the district court.
IAR 24(±) (or (h) in amended rule, effective July 1, 2011). See also IAR 23( c) & (d) (filing fee
waiver) & IAR 27(±) (clerk's record waiver).
The statute incorporated by IAR 23 is Idaho Code 31-3220, which provides in part as
follows:
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(2) The court may authorize commencement or defense of any action without
prepayment of fees, costs or security, by any indigent person not a prisoner,
providing:
(a) The person files an affidavit that he is indigent as provided in subsection (3)
of this section, and unable to pay fees, costs or give security; and
(b) The court finds, after informal inquiry, that the person is indigent for the
purpose of prepayment fees costs or security.
Idaho Code 31-3220(2). "Indigent" is defined by that statute as "a person who is not a prisoner .
. . , and who is found by the court to be unable to pay fees, costs or give security, for the purpose
of prepayment fees, costs or security in a civil action." Idaho Code 32-3220(1 )( d). It is made
expressly applicable to appeals by subsections (1 )(a) and (5) of that same statute. The latter
subsection directs that if such indigence is found, the court may direct that the "expense of
printing the record and/or transcript for use on appeal be paid out of the district court fund of the
county in which the action was filed (here Ada)." Idaho Code 3220(5).
Subsection (3) of the same statute contains the specific allegations which must be
contained in the Affidavit in order to waive fees or costs. Every one of the items required was
contained in both Dr. Harper's original and amended affidavits. Id., (3), (a) through G).
Substantial weight is assigned to a trial court's determination in disposition of motion for
waiver of costs for clerk's record and court reporter's transcripts. Johnson v. Jones,, 105 Idaho
602, 603, 671 P.2d 1065 (1983). However, the Court in Johnson stated that the trial judge's
discretion was entitled to great weight because he had an opportunity to observe the plaintiff at
trial for several days, and to judge his credibility. In this case Judge Greenwood, who ruled on
indigence, was not the trial judge.
In Johnson the only issue was whether the trial court, which had granted a waiver of the
filing fee, erred in refusal to waive the cost of transcripts on appeal.

Unlike the Johnson

plaintiffs, here Dr. Harper swore he has no ability to borrow, is the only plaintiff (his wife is not
a party), and has no set monthly income, but rather a net negative income.

HARPER v. SEAMONS, APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF, Case# 38521

-13

Here Dr. Harper's indigence clearly appeared on the face of his Motion. The Record
does not indicate that the trial judge expressly recognized that the issue was one of discretion.
And the court's discretion was abused, since it was undisputed that Dr. Harper is impecunious.
The defense filed no written response or opposition to any of Dr. Harper's sworn motions to
waive costs on appeal.

Determination of this must be based on the Plaintiff's/Appellant's

Amended Motion and Affidavit.for Fee Waiver, and Judge Greenwood's ruling as contained in

the Reporter's Transcript of Excerpt of Motion for Fee Waiver filed March 30, 2011. ROA 11. 7
Because the trial court failed to even put the fee-related motions in their file, and because the
trial judge did not make findings or issue an order, reversal is called for on that basis alone.
Judge Greenwood was the assigned judge, but Senior Judge Goff out of Canyon County
heard the trial. Judge Greenwood gave the following reasons for not granting waiver of costs:
(a) Dr. Harper had attached his Schedule C, but not his entire tax return. Tr. 3 :6-10.
However, there was no requirement that any portion of his return be attached. The
entire return was included with the Motion filed with this Court.
(b) He had allegedly omitted his wife's income. Tr. 3:11-17. However, he did state his
wife's income, on page 3 of his Affidavit. He did and does claim that her income is
not proper to consider, since she is not a party to the case. But even if her income
were for some reason considered, he is indigent.
(c) He "appears to be" underemployed. Tr. 3:23 to 4:10. Dr. Harper is a religious pastor
and counselor, and publisher of a Christian newspaper. His net income is negative.
(d) Judge Greenwood was bothered by the fact that Dr. Harper paid a relatively modest
tax refund to his attorney to file the appeal. Tr. 3: 18-22.

7

On April 13, 2011 Dr. Harper filed with this Court Appellant's Verified Motion for Waiver of Costs. This Court
denied the motion to waive costs on May 16, 2011, without explanation.
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Based on those bases, without findings (written or oral), Judge Greenwood recommended to this
Court that the motion be denied.

Tr. 5:2-9.

To date, this Court has followed that

recommendation. See, Order Denying Motion for Waiver of Costs, dated May 16, 2011. To the
extent a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's denial is necessary, it is hereby so moved.
A remand would be appropriate, with an order requiring production of the complaint trial
and hearing transcript, as requested in Dr. Harper's original Notice of Appeal. The same result
could be reached based on the Motion filed with this Court as well.

2.

A JNOV was required. Now on to the substantive issues. Dr. Harper filed a

timely post trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 50(b ).
The trial court should have granted such a judgment. When a motion for JNOV is filed, the trial
court should grant it if, drawing all inferences from the evidence in a light favorable to the
nonmoving party, there is not substantial competent evidence to support the jury verdict. Brand
v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 639 P.2d 429 (1981). This is such a case, since the fault and fact of

injury from the car collision are not at isues (though the extent is disputed), and yet no general
damages were awarded.
This Court has recently addressed the standard of review on appeal, where the trial judge
has denied a motion for JNOV.

Knipe Land Company v. Robertson, Docket No. 37002

(IDSCCI), 2011 Opinion 64, - - Idaho - -,- - P.3d - - (Idaho May 26, 2011). There the
Court examined the verdict fonn, and found that the jury's verdict was not supported by the
evidence. Accordingly, it was error for the trial judge not to grant a JNOV, and the Court
reversed. In so doing, the Court quoted from a 2009 case for the standard of review:
This Court reviews de novo a district court's decision to deny a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. The standard of review of a grant or denial of a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the same as that of the trial court when ruling on
the motion. A trial court will deny a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict if
there is evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could
HARPER v. SEAMONS, APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF, Case# 38521
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have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury. A trial court is not free to weigh the
evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses, making its own independent findings of
fact and comparing them to the jury's findings. A trial court reviews the facts as if the
moving party admitted any adverse facts and draws all reasonable conclusions in favor of
the non-moving party.

Knipe Land Company, supra, quoting Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 774-75, 203 P.3d 702,
704-05 (2009) (internal citations omitted). See also, that approach as applied in the even more
recent decision of Schroeder v. Partin, Docket No. 37228 (IDSCCI), 2011 Opinion 89, _ _
Idaho _ _ , _ _ P.3d _ _ (Idaho August 4, 2011).
The Court considers all the evidence together to judge whether it substantially supports
the verdict. Watson v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643, 827 P.2d 656 (1992).

8

The

9

standard is whether the evidence is of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable
minds could reach the same conclusion as did the jury. 10

If the evidence is so weak that

reasonable minds could not reach the same conclusion the jury has (absent passion, prejudice or
misconduct), the Court should grant JNOV. Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 518
P.2d 1194 (1974).

That is this case: reasonable minds could not find the defendant was

responsible for injuring the plaintiff, and for some amount of his medical bills, and then find
there was no pain, suffering or other general damages. But that is precisely what the jury did. It
is difficult to imagine a more classic situation of a verdict which is unsupported by the law, logic
or facts.
Here Dr.

Harper's JNOV

11

request challenged that failure to award general

(noneconomic) damages, as well as the award of but a fraction of his economic loss. An IRCP
50(b) motion is treated as a delayed motion for directed verdict, so the standard for both is the
same. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986). Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co.,

8

See also, See, Hibbler v. Fisher, 109 Idaho 1007, 1010, 712 P.2d 708, 711 (Ct. App. 1985).
See, Smith v. Paegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 749 P.2d 1012 (Ct. App.), cert. den., 116 Idaho 467, 776 P.2d 829 (1988).
10
See, Leavitt v. Swain, 133 Idaho 624, 628, 991 P.2d 349,353 (1999).
11
A JNOV may be prayed for in the alternative with a motion for a new trial under IRCP 59(a).

9
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98 Idaho 266,274,561 P.2d 1299, 1397 (1977). "The function ofI.R.C.P. 50(b) is to give the
trial court the last opportunity to order the judgment that the law requires." Quick at 764, 727
P .2d at 1992.

3.

The verdict the jury entered defied reason. On the Verdict Form all 12 jurors

answered Question 1, whether defendant was "negligent which proximately caused damages to
the plaintiff?" as "Yes." 12 All 12 jurors answered Question 2, which was whether plaintiff was
"negligent which proximately caused some of the plaintiff's damages?" as "No." The jury
properly skipped # 3, which was a comparative negligence apportionment. Id. Question No. 4
asked, "What is the total amount of damage sustained by Plaintiff proximately caused by the
Defendant's negligence?" There were two categories with blanks. The jury filled them in as
follows:
1. Economic Damages

$4,100 (after writing then striking $3,100)

2. Non-economic Damages

$0

ROA 9, October 7, 2010.
This question, number 4, was signed by 10 of the jurors. The change from $3, I 00 to
$4,100 appears to have been initialed by someone other than the foreman and, contrary to the
instructions, was signed only by that other juror.
To help the jury in their responsibility, the jury instructions given included # 16, which
provided:
If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant, the jury must
determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff
for any damages proved to be proximately caused by the defendant's negligence. The
elements of damage the jury may consider are:
12

Defendant (who admits running a red light and hitting Dr. Harper) did not admit fault, or even concede that Dr.
Harper had no fault. The jury, therefore, had to determine comparative negligence. She was found 100% at fault,
and Dr. Harper was found to have no fault.
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A. Non-economic damages

The nature of the injuries'
The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future;
The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities;
The disfigurement caused by the injuries;
The aggravation caused to any preexisting condition.
B. Economic damages
1. The reasonable value of necessary medical care received and expenses incurred as a
result of the injury and the present cash value of medical care and expenses reasonably
certain and necessary to be required in the future ....
The jury, after finding total defendant liability, awarded precious little in economic damages, and
awarded no non-economic damages. This means they found:
•

No physical pain and suffering, despite overwhelming evidence that there was

•

No disfigurement, despite the fact that Dr. Harper got a facial droop and eye droop and
problem, relating to the seventh cranial nerve, for which he had to have surgery

•

No mental pain and suffering

•

No humiliation

•

No loss of enjoyment of life

•

No weakness

•

No inconvenience

•

No impainnent of ability or loss of life activities and

•

No aggravation of any pre-existing condition.

This was contrary to law and to the jury instructions themselves.
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[t is difficult or impossible to tie the amount of jury's verdict for economic damages to
any particular medical bills which plaintiff incurred. The medical expenses shown in Exhibit 3 13
total nearly SI 8,000 in medical expenses. Trial Exhibit 5 and SA were a summary of medical
expenses related to the accident, prepared by the plaintiff.

It showed medical expenses of

$74,100, and over $100,000 lifetime future medical expenses.
At trial both Dr. Harper and several of his providers testified as to his examination,
diagnoses and treatment, and that the medical services were proximately caused by the accident
in which defending hit his vehicle. How can the tens of thousands of dollars in medical expenses
be reduced to $4,100, consistent with the law and the jury instructions? Which provider's
charges were awarded? None of them match that amount, and no defense argument supported
such an amount.

The defendant's experts did not testify that there was no injury, or that

treatment was unreasonable.
The jury found (and the defense did not even deny) that Dr. Harper incurred medical
bills. The only evidence relative to pain and suffering was that he had great pain, reduced range
of motion (Ors. Greenwald, 14 Lewer and Ferch)), tinnitus, hyperacusis, fatigue, memory loss,
depression, confusion, eye and face drooping, requiring eye surgery, etc. They testified that he
suffered from a mild traumatic brain injury (TMBI).

Defendant's own expert, Dr. Richard

Wilson, conceded that Dr. Harper suffered back and neck sprain/strain injuries, and would have
pain following such a collision, and that the pain would last up to 3 months. Necessary to the
fact that medical expenses were awarded is that Dr. Harper must have been in pain and

13

Exhibit 3 was admitted at trial. Exhibit 3A, which was rejected, was a more complete summary of the medical
expenses.
14
The use and testifying of Dr. Greenwald injected a sense of unfairness or impropriety into the trial. She treated
Dr. Harper at the St. Alphonsus Brain Injury Center. She then was hired by the defense counsel to be an
''independent" medical examiner. Adding more to the conflict of interest and duel role issues, her partner also
treated Dr. Harper previously for different injuries in the same accident. .
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experiencing negative symptoms.15 Any symptoms of any of those listed above would constitute
general damages, and of necessity require an award of general damages.
Several witnesses, including Pastor David Hardesty, Dr. Harper's wife, Dan Milholland
and Drs. Lewer and Ferch all testified about seeing Dr. Harper suffer pain and discomfort after
the crash that were not present before. They also testified that they noticed the facial droop
caused by the accident. Dr. Harper and others testified about his lost ability to sing or speak I
public, attend social events, enjoy church activities and meetings, etc.
Yet in the face of all of this evidence, the jury failed to award even a dollar for his
suffering or loss. This result is clearly not based on the evidence, and thus judgment should be
entered in his favor in an amount greater than the jury awarded, notwithstanding the verdict. The
jury must have been angry at or prejudice against Dr. Harper. Even if jurors don't like someone,
damages incurred must be awarded.

4.

A New Trial or Additur should have been ordered. Recently the Court of

Appeals reiterated that the decision to grant a new trial is within the trial judge's discretion.
Tiegs v. Robertson, 149 Idaho 482, 236 P.3d 474 (Idaho App. 2010). In determining whether to

15

Dr. Harper's injuries and symptoms to which he and others testified include blunt head trauma (diagnosed by Dr.
Katz, Dr. Wurster and Dr. Ferch), mild traumatic brain injury (treated at St. Alphonsus Hospital Brain Injury
Rehabilitation program, Mild Post Traumatic Brain Injury, and diagnosed by Dr. Smith, a neurologist, and Dr.
Beaver, a neuropsychologist, as well as Dr. Wurster, Dr. Cline (neurologist) and Dr. Kraft), facial nerve damage,
causing left facial drooping and surgery to the left eye (performed at the Moran Eye Center, University of Utah,
leaving him with extreme dry eye, diagnosed by Dr. Shi, Dr. Katz and Dr. Smith), bobbing head tremor related to
the MTBI (Dr. Lewer and Dr. Smith both observed and testified), dizziness, confusion, cognitive problems,
difficulty with concentration, and balance problems (reported to various health care providers, and noted by Dr.
Ferch; treated at St. Alphonsus Hospital Brain Injury Rehabilitation program, as well as Intermountain Physical
Therapy), hearing loss (Dr. Shi and Dr. Wurster), Tinnitus and hyperacusis {ringing ears and oversensitivity; to
noise, Dr. Shi and Dr. Wurster, requiring purchase and use of a sound generator to mask the sound when sleeping),
sleep disorder (treated at
Disorder Clinic at Oregon State University), cervical strain/sprain (Dr. Kraft, Dr.
Lewer and Dr. Ferch), left sided neck, headaches, chest and arm pain (Drs. Lewer and Ferch), left sided body
weakness (Drs. Kraft, Katz, Weinberg, Lewer, Smith and Intem10untain Physical Therapy), dysphonia (voice
weakness, along with vocal cord paresis, noted by Dr. Wurster, and treated at Oregon State's Voice and Swallowing
Clinic), neck and back pain increased from his previous baseline (Dr. Lewer, Dr. Ferch).
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grant a new trial (unlike a JNOV), the court is not required to view the evidence in favor of the
non-moving party. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P .2d 1187 (1986). 16
The trial court must weigh the trial evidence, including its own determination of the
credibility of the witnesses, and grant the motion only where the verdict is not in accord
with the court's assessment of the clear weight of the evidence.

Nepanuseno v. Hansen, 140 Idaho 942,944, 104 P.3d 984,987 (Id. Ct. App. 2004). Of course a
new trial should be granted only if it is likely to produce a different result. 17
A new trial is appropriate when the verdict is not in accordance with the trial court's
assessment of the clear weight of the evidence. Carlson v. Stanger, 146 Idaho 642, 600 P .3d
1191, 1197 (Idaho App. 2008).
Here the factors mentioned above relating to the JNOV required, in the alternative, a new
trial or additur. I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) permits a new trial if the damages are inadequate, and appear
to have been given, like here, under the influence of passion or prejudice. Under I.R.C.P.
59(a)(5), the trial court is to weigh the evidence and then compare the jury's verdict to what

the judge would have found, ifthere had been no jury. If the disparity between the two verdicts
is so great that it appears that the award was influenced by passion or prejudice, a new trial
should be granted. 18 In deciding a new trial motion, the court has greater discretion than in a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Court of Appeals has stated:
[An order for a new trial] is the court's statement that it believes the jury erred in
its findings or in the application of law as contained in the court's instructions,
and that the issue should be submitted to another jury for redetermination.
Because a jury will still determine the factual issues, the standard for granting a
new trial is much less rigorous than that applied to motions for directed verdict or
16

"We conclude that the 'substantial evidence' standard is not appropriate for new trial motions. To adopt such a
standard would, in effect, eliminate new trial motions, and leave a trial court with a choice between granting a
judgment n.o.v. or acquiescing in what the court believes to be a flawed verdict. We do not believe that a trial
court should be limited in this fashion." Sheets, 104 Idaho 880, 883-84, 664 P .2d 787 (Ct. App. 1983).
17

The judge "must disclose his reasoning for granting or denying motions for a new trial and/or remittitur or additur
unless those reasons are obvious from the record itself Such motions involve what the Court of Appeals has aptly
characterized as the exercise of 'adjudicative discretion', discretion which determines or directly affects the outcome
of litigation and, therefore, has a substantial impact on the litigants." Quick, 111 Idaho @ 772, 727 P .2d @ 1200.
18
See, e.g., Dineen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620,603 P.2d 575 (1979).
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judgment n.o.v. Wright & Miller, supra, Civil § 2531. A motion for new trial
should be granted if the court believes that the jury verdict 'is not in accord with
law or justice.' [cite omitted]. Implicit in this statement is the recognition that
where reasonable minds could disagree, but the trial court believes the jury
verdict is in error, the benefit of arriving at a legally correct and just resolution of
a dispute through a new trial outweighs the disadvantage of uncertainty, time and
expense incident to continued litigation.
Sheets v. Argo-West, 104 Idaho 880, 883-84, 664 P.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1983). On granting a new

trial for inadequate or excessive damages, the Court of Appeals observed that IRCP 59(a)(5):
allow[s] a court to order a new trial if the jury awards 'excessive damages or
inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion
or prejudice.' ·where the difference between the jury's damage award and the
amount the trial court would have awarded is so great as to suggest, but not
establish, passion or prejudice, the granting of a new trial is appropriate.
Sheets, 104 Idaho at 887, 664 P .2d at 794.

Here the damage award, and especially the zero non-economic damages, are inadequate
and not supported by the evidence. The logical explanation is that the jury was influenced by
prejudice against Dr. Harper: the precise issue required for a 59(a)(5) new trial. The passion and
prejudice were likely influenced the jury hearing extensive evidence, seeing exhibits and hearing
argument about Dr. Harper's license revocation problems, as well as video evidence (which Dr.
Harper's counsel had never seen), in which Dr. Harper criticized homosexuals.

These

evidentiary matters also invoke IRCP 59(a)(1)1 9 and (7), for a new trial in the event of an
irregularity in the proceedings preventing a fair trial and error in law, respectively.

5.

The Zero Award for Noneconomic Damages cannot stand. As noted, failure

to award any noneconomic damages had no reasonable basis in the evidence, and is inadequate
as a matter of law. It is difficult to fathom how the jury could have listened to the evidence,
including the injuries listed above, and not found that Dr. Harper suffered any pain or suffering,
19

Irregularity in the jury's special verdict form may constitute irregularity in the proceedings under IRCP 59( a)(l ).
Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868,879,204 P.3d 508,519 (2009).
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but that he did incur medical bills and had extremely well documented treatment treatment for
crash-related injuries, which injuries were also well documented.
I.R.C.P. 59( a)(5) permits a new trial, if the damages are excessive and appear to
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. Pursuant to I.R.C.P.
59(a)(5), the trial court is to weigh the evidence and then compare the jury's
verdict to what the judge would have found, if there were no jury. If the disparity
between the two verdicts is so great that it appears to the trial court that the award
was rendered under the influence of passion or prejudice, then a new trial should
be granted. See, e.g., Dineen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575 (1979). In
deciding a motion for new trial, the trial court has greater discretion than in
deciding a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Sheets v. Argo-West, Inc., 104 Idaho 880, 883-84, 664 P.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1983).
In 2009 this Court squarely addressed a jury's failure to award noneconomic damages in
a personal injury trial, when economic damages are awarded. "Due to inconsistencies in the
[special] verdict form, the Court reverses the district court's denial of [the Plaintiff's] motion for
a new trial."

Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 879, 204 P.3d 508, 519 (2009) (emphasis

supplied). The Cramer jury had found that the Plaintiff suffered economic damages of $27,000
in her husband's death, but (similar to this case) awarded zero noneconomic damages. The
Court first said it could not reconcile a verdict in which the agents (a doctor and nurse) were
responsible, but their employer hospital was not. Cramer observed that the "Special Verdict
Form is unmistakably confusing."
The jury's award of only economic damages is curious, troubling and potentially
inconsistent . ... Although it is permissible for a jury to find that the Plaintiff failed to
meet the burden of proving non-economic damages, it is curious how a jury could find
negligent infliction of emotional distress and then not compensate [her] for any of the
emotional distress she suffered . . . . This Court holds that the inconsistencies in the
verdict form and the jury's findings are irreconcilable and the motion for a new
trial should have been granted.
Cramer, supra, 146 Idaho@ 882, 204 P.3d@ 521 (emphasis added). A similar analysis should
apply here. It is curious, troubling and inconsistent to find an injury, but award nothing for it. A
new trial was appropriate in Cramer. The judge here erred by letting the verdict stand. Id., 146
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Idaho@ 880, 204 P.3d@ 520, quoted with approval by Tiegs v. Robertson, 149 Idaho 482, 236
P.3d 474 (Idaho App. 2010). The bare folly of awarding medical expenses but no general
damages for the same injury is legally indistinguishable from Cramer awarding economic
damages for infliction of emotional harm, but no non-economic damages.

6.

The Evidence is Insufficient to Justify the Verdict. As discussed above, a

59(a)(6) new trial should be ordered, since the evidence does not justify the verdict. This verdict
is not supported by the evidence, as outlined in the section relating to Dr. Harper's motion for
JNOV.
There is a qualitative difference between a trial judge's role in deciding whether a new
trial is justified based on the insufficiency of the evidence under Rule 59(a)(6), and
whether a new trial is justified based on the amount of the jury's award of damages under
Rule 59(a)(5).
Quickv. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 768, 727 P.2d 1187, 1196 (1986).
The judge "weigh[ s] the evidence to determine (1) whether the verdict is against his or
her view of the clear weight of the evidence; and (2) whether a new trial would produce a
different result." Harger v. Teton Springs Golf and Casting, LLC, 145 Idaho 716, 719, 84 P.3d
841, 844 (2008). Judge Goff did not fully perform this function, it is suggested, or he would
have granted a new trial. He placed great emphasis and reliance on the incendiary video tape
that, as discussed above, was identified as Exhibit 765, which was viewed by the jury but not
preserved in any form, 20 and which is shown as Not admitted on the Court Record's Exhibit List.

7.

Additur is Appropriate Under IRCP 59.1. Dr. Harper suggested to the trial

court that additur of $150,000 for noneconomic damages, and $13,900 to $67,900 economic
damages would have been appropriate, if the trial court was unwilling to grant a new trial. Like
20

There was no record preserved of the video that is Exhibit 765, as clearly stated in the Clerk's Record. R. 361.
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the other post-trial motions, additur was denied. The standard of review is abuse of discretion.
Hei v. Holzer, 181 P.3d 489,495 (Idaho 2008). This Court has addressed additur in lieu of a new

trial:
The district court may grant a new trial or additur for "excessive damages or
inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion
or prejudice.' LR.C.P. 59(a)(5). The district court should make such an award
only if, after assessing the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence,
it determines that 'the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the
evidence.' Hudelson v. Delta Intl. Mach. Corp., 142 Idaho 244, 248, 127 P.3d
147, 151 (2005). When the district court believes that substantial and competent
evidence supports the verdict but its assessment of damages substantially diverges
from the jury's award of damages such that only passion or prejudice could
explain it, then it should grant a new trial or an additur. Collins v. Jones, 131
Idaho 556, 558, 961 P.2d 647, 649 (1998). We review the grant or denial of a
new trial or an additur for an abuse of discretion. Id. We "primarily focus upon
the process used by the trial judge in reaching his or her decision, not upon the
result of that decision" because the district court is best able to assess the
witnesses and evidence presented. Hudelson, 142 Idaho at 248, 127 P.3d at 151.

In Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 158 P.3d 937, (2007), the trial court looks at additur or a
new trial based on whether damages were so insufficient as to be against the clear weight of
evidence, like here.
In this case, the district court found that 'the verdict shocked the conscience of the
Court because the verdict was excessively low given the nature and extent of the
Plaintiff1s permanent and debilitating injuries.' No one factor is appropriate to
award a new trial or an additur because 'how substantial the disparity must be
differs with each factual context and with the trial judge's sense of fairness and
justice.' Collins, 131 Idaho at 558, 961 P.2d at 649 (citing Quick v. Crane, 111
Idaho 759, 769, 727 P.2d 1187, 1197 (1986)). Moreover, Puckett did not need to
prove that passion or prejudice affected the jury's verdict; the appearance alone
was sufficient to justify a new trial or additur. Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620,
625-6, 603 P.2d 575, 580-1 (1979). Regarding the amount of the damage award,
the district court stated that the jury was unduly prejudiced by testimony of
Puckett's prior abuse of prescription medication. The additur for non-economic
damages was based on Puckett's life expectancy and to compensate her for the
pain and weakness she would suffer in that timeframe. As for economic damages,
the district court noted that Verska did not present evidence to refute Puckett's
medical expense and income claims. The district court acted within the bounds of
its discretion and exercised reason, finding that passion or prejudice appeared to
have affected the award of damages. We hold that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in granting the motion for an additur or new trial.
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Puckett, supra, 144 Idaho 161, 158 P.3d 937 (2007). 21 A similar analysis should apply here.

Just as Judge McLaughlin was upheld in finding that the jury was prejudiced against the plaintiff
in Puckett after of prescription drug abuse came in, Judge Goff here should have found that the
jury was prejudiced in its deliberations, in that it returned such a shockingly low amount for pain
and suffering: zero.
The jury here was probably prejudiced by hearing inflammatory evidence about Dr.
Harper's counseling license, and highly prejudicial related documents. And they were likely
influenced by passion or prejudice caused by Dr. Harper's criticism of homosexuals, and by his
stage persona demeanor, on a surprise video presented at trial. In tum, the verdict should not be
allowed to stand, and a new trial or additur should be granted.
IRCP 59.1 does not required that the Court (or trial court) determine what it was that
inflamed passion or prejudice. Just that it occurred. This can be inferred from miniscule medical
expenses and zero general damages which the jury awarded.
Given the jury's failure to award anything for pain and suffering, Dr. Harper is entitled to
a new trial under LR. C.P. 59 .1 (or additur), since the evidence was insufficient to justify a zero
verdict for general damages. After the evidence, the Court instructed the jury2 2 to determine the
amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the Plaintiff for any damages
proved to be proximately caused by defendant's negligence. 23 Obviously the jury ignored this

21

In Pucket the trial judge was upheld in the following additur: The jury awarded $92,720 in economic damages,
and $50,000 in noneconomic damages. The Judge increased the economic damages to $289,971.22 and
noneconomic damages to $400,000. Defendant was allowed to request a new trial as an alternative, however.
22

"If the jury decides the Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant, the jury must determine the amount of
money that will reasonably and.fairly compensate the Plaintiff/or any damages proved to be proximately caused by
the defendant's negligence." Jury Instr. 16. That same instruction goes on to list 5 kinds of non-economic damages,
and lists them before economic damages. Id. @ A.
23

The damages instruction given was based IDJI 9.01, which provides:
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instruction, as well as the instructions on the face of the verdict form. Jury Instructions 16 and
19A.

8.

The Verdict Form as Filled Out is Legally Invalid. It is internally and facially

inconsistent, and amounts to a failure to follow the court's instructions. As Rule 59(a)(6) allows
a new trial for insufficient evidence, "or where the verdict is against the law," 24 IRCP 59(7)
authorizes a new trial for errors of law and procedure. Here both parties submitted special
verdict forms, and such a form was used. IRCP 49(b) is the authority for special verdicts.
"If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant, the jury must determine the amount of
money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any damages proved to be proximately caused by
the defendant's negligence.
The elements of damage the jury may consider are:
A. Non-economic damages

L The nature of the injuries;

2. The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future;
3. The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities;
4. The disfigurement caused by the injuries;

5. The aggravation caused to any preexisting condition.
B. Economic damages
l. The reasonable value of necessary medical care received and expenses incurred as a result of the injury [and the
present cash value of medical care and expenses reasonably certain and necessary to be required in the future];

2. The reasonable value of the past

lost as a result of the injury;

3. The present cash value of the future earning capacity lost because of the injury, taking into consideration the
earning power, age, health, life expectancy, mental and physical abilities, habits, and disposition of the plaintiff, and
any other circumstances shown by the evidence.

4. The reasonable value of necessary services provided by another in doing things for the plaintiff, which, except for
the injury, the plaintiff would ordinarily have performed ... ;
Whether the plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide." IDJI 9.01.
24

Tiegs v. Robertson, 149 Idaho

236 P.3d 474,478 (Idaho App. 2010); emphasis in body added.
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The court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general
verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of
which is necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or
instruction as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to the
interrogatories and to render a general verdict, and the court shall direct the jury
both to make written answers and to render a general verdict. When the general
verdict and the answers are harmonious, the court shall direct the entry of the
appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers. \Vhen the answers are
consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general
verdict, the court may direct the entry of judgment in accordance with the
answers, notwithstanding the general verdict or may return the jury for further
consideration of its answers and verdict or may order a new trial. When the
answers are inconsistent with each other and one or more is likewise
inconsistent with the general verdict, the court shall not direct the entry of
judgment but may return the jury for further consideration of its answers
and verdict or may order a new trial.
Id., 236 P .3d @ 4 78-79 (emphasis supplied). IRCP 49(b) is a separate, additional basis for
ordering a new trial or JNOV. The jury having clearly erred, it was reversible error in tum for
the trial judge to leave the verdict and its underlying form uncorrected and invalid.
In Tiegs, supra, the trial judge found the special interrogatory responses as to proximate
cause were inconsistent with the apportionment of fault, and the damage award. This was found
to be a proper exercise of the judge's discretion.
This Court finds that the jury's verdict is inconsistent and beyond reasonable
reconciliation. The jury contradicts itself throughout the findings. [Cramer]
properly objected when the verdict was returned and asked the court to have the
jury reconcile the verdict. The court declined to do so and this Court cannot
reasonably reconcile the verdict. This Court reverses the judgment and grants
[Cramer's] motion for a new trial.
Cramerv. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 880-81, 204 P.3d 508, 520-21 (2009), quoted with approval in
Tiegs, supra, 149 Idaho 482,236 P.3d@480.
In granting the motion for a new trial, the district court ruled that the findings by

the jury that [defendants'] negligence were not proximate causes of Tiegs' death
and injuries were inconsistent with the jury's apportionment of fault and money
damages and since this inconsistency could not be reconciled,
was entitled
to a new trial. We conclude that such a determination conforms to the applicable
legal standards and was not an abuse of discretion....

HARPER v. SEAA,JONS, APPELLANT'S OPENLVG BRIEF, Case#

-28

[I]n this case, the contradictory findings by the jury can only lead to the
conclusion that the verdict cannot be reasonably reconciled-thus granting the
court discretion under IRCP 49(b) to grant a new trial. In addition, as in
Cramer, the grant of a new trial was appropriate under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6)
because the verdict was "against the law" since proving liability for damages
requires proof that the liable party was a proximate cause of the injury." Id.
Tiegs v. Robertson, 149 Idaho 482,236 P.3d 474,479 (Idaho App. 2010) (emphasis added).

9.

Evidentiary Issues Necessitate a New TriaJ.

Two exhibits were rejected,

apparently as a sanction, and two others were admitted, which were more prejudicial than
probative. Individually and cumulatively, they resulted in an unfair trial, requiring reversal.
IRCP 59(7) authorizes a new trial for errors oflaw and procedure. And IRCP 59(a)(6) allows a
new trial "where the verdict is against the law." Tiegs v. Robertson, 149 Idaho 482, 236 PJd
474, 478 (Idaho App. 2010).

10.

Improper Evidence was Received. And that improper evidence was the most

influential at the trial,
Licensure Evidence.

The jury received documents and evidence that Dr.

Harper's counselor's license was revoked for alleged excessive payment by a patient. The
evidence alluded to greed and overreaching. Exhibits 762 and 763 (State Licensing Board Letter
and Findings by State Board resulting in license suspension). Both were admitted over plaintiff
objection. The licensing issue was never raised until trial, and the exhibits were never provided
in discovery, or put on any exhibit list. If a party has testimony it is likely to use, it cannot wait
and spring it as a surprise, simply by calling it rebuttal testimony. See, e.g., Hei v. Holzer, 181
P.3d 489, 495 (Idaho 2008). This Court has addressed additur in lieu of a new trial:
The district court may grant a new trial or additur for "excessive damages or
inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion
or prejudice.' I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5). The district court should make such an award
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only if, after assessing the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence,
it determines that 'the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the
evidence.' Hudelson v. Delta Intl. ~Mach. Corp., 142 Idaho 244, 248, 127 P.3d
I 47, 151 (2005). When the district court believes that substantial and competent
evidence supports the verdict but its assessment of damages substantially diverges
from the jury's award of damages such that only passion or prejudice could
explain it, then it should grant a new trial or an additur. Collins v. Jones, 131
Idaho 556, 558, 961 P.2d 647, 649 (1998). We review the grant or denial of a
new trial or an additur for an abuse of discretion. Id. We "primarily focus upon
the process used by the trial judge in reaching his or her decision, not upon the
result of that decision" because the district court is best able to assess the
witnesses and evidence presented. Hudelson, 142 Idaho at 248, 127 P .3d at 151.
In Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 158 P.3d 937, (2007); City ofAfcCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho
580,586, 130 P.3d 1118, 1124 (2006). Defendant may argue that Dr. Harper' "opened the door"
for such evidence. Dr. Harper disagrees, but even if that were true, it would not change the fact
that the trial was rendered unfair, and a new one would con-ect it. Nor would it change the fact
that the defendant had the exhibits and did not produce them pursuant to the trial court's
scheduling orders.
Allowing the discussion and exhibits relating to the licensure suspension was exacerbated
by the fact that the trial judge, while admitting those items, refused to admit Exhibit 34, Post
Hearing Brief, which explained Dr. Harper's side of the issues, and why the State Board had no

business injecting itself in a religious counseling and free will donation situation.
Denver Interview Video. Similarly, jurors saw a video which Dr. Harper's counsel had

never seen. It portrayed him in a light which allowed the defense to argue to the jury that his
symptoms were magnified. Defense counsel used it to argue Dr. Harper's credibility, and to
argue that he did not sustain a brain injury.
Although assigned an exhibit number, 765, there was no record preserved of the video
shown to the jury, as clearly stated in the Clerk's Record. R. 361. Further, the Court's Record
shows, on Defendant's Exhibit List, that the video, Exhibit 765, was not admitted into
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evidence. 25

The confusion and mishandling of this key exhibit make m all the more of a

problem, and illustrate how it poisoned the trial and jury. 26
The improper video included such inflammatory comments as Dr. Harper criticizing
homosexuals. It showed Dr. Harper in his stage persona, evidencing a level of energy beyond
what he showed at trial. Judge Goff noted that this was probably the most influential exhibit in
the whole trial (orally and in Order of January 10, 2011, page 3). 27 And yet it was not preserved
in the Record, and this Court cannot view it. This alone is a basis to reverse.
These items of evidence were more prejudicial than probative, and resulted in an unfair
trial. As to the video, neither Dr. Harper nor the Court had a chance to view it before it was
shown, or to ask for redactions (of which there should have been several). To be admissible, the
disturbing evidence must first have been relevant.
'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.
IRE 401. Even this threshold was not met by the lengthy foray into Dr. Harper's licensure
dispute, or by video where he criticized gays, and which contained long discourse on his
personal religious beliefs. "Evidence which his not relevant is inadmissible." IRE 402.
But all of the above evidence was also far more prejudicial than it was probative. The
Court even admitted that the evidence on licensure was not on point, but rather a "side road."
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
25

See Defendant's Exhibit List, page 000002, last exhibit line, which lists Exhibit 765, "Interview with Dr. Harper
on Denver Christian Talk Show" as "Marked, NOT admitted." Emphasis in original. Clerk's Record on Appeal.
26
During trial plaintiffs undersigned counsel assumed that the Exhibit List of the defendant was a proper
description of the exhibits. Later examination reveals that the list goes beyond that, indicating defendant's
interpretation and desired highlights of the exhibits, with what amounts to editorial comments. This is improper at
best. An egregious example is Exhibit 663, the description of which states, "Note Dr. Rupp refused to testify." That
is not a proper item for consideration, and was not offered into evidence. It is likely this list went to the jury with
the exhibits, unfairly prejudicing them, and amounting to comments, highlights and/or a brief written argument to
the jury not provided for by rule.
27
Judge Goff wrote that it was "substantially probative: and "very probative" regarding Plaintiffs credibility.
Order, pp. 4-5.
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jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
IRE 403.

The probative value of the licensure scandal and gay criticism was limited or

nonexistent, but the unfair prejudice of each was substantial. It was also "misleading the jury,"
and caused "undue delay" and "waste of time." Id. Its inclusion denied a fair trial, particularly
in light of the fact that none of the evidence was produced in advance. Even if relevance is
found, the court erred in not finding whether the probative value of the evidence was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,
227 P.3d 918,921 (2010).
Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center is helpful. In that medical malpractice

case the trial judge was affirmed in excluding testimony defendant's expert, who found Plaintiff
to have a nonspecified personality disorder, making her likely to manipulate, fake and lie.
Though relevant, it was more prejudicial than probative. 134 Idaho 46, 56, 995 P .2d 816, 826
(2000).

28

It was likewise proper to exclude evidence that Plaintiff gave away 100 of her pain

pills since, again, it had relevance but was more prejudicial.
Further, there is another striking similarity in Perry.

The defendant there offered a

videotape of the plaintiff, which apparently showed her behaving inconsistently with her injuryrelated symptoms. That is the same alleged purpose for which the defense in this case offered
the (unpreserved) video here. In that case it was proper for the trial judge to exclude the tape,
since it was not provided until shortly before trial.

Here the video was not identified or

provided until the moment it was offered into evidence.
Yet Judge Goff allowed it to be played for the jury. Like here, the Perry defendants said
the tape should be allowed because it was for impeachment purposes. "The Hospital's attempt

28

In Perry the injured Plaintiff testified she had not jet skied at Mantua after the accident, and defendants offered
their investigator's video tape showing that she had. Since the video was not produced, it was properly excluded. Id.
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to characterize the videotape as impeachment, simply because Perry testified that she did not jetski on that particular lake, was somewhat disingenuous." Perry v. Magic Valley Regional

Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46, 53, 995 P.2d 816, 823 (2000). In this case the video, as in Perry,
was merely standard defense evidence that might be used to dispute the seriousness of the
plaintiffs injuries, or to challenge his credibility. There was nothing special that made this
"impeachment," such that assigning such a label allowed ambush, and exempted the defense
from following the discovery rules and pretrial orders to produce evidence.
The tape and the licensure evidence were direct evidence items, offered with no prior
notice or production, under the apparent guise of impeachment.

It was not an abuse of

discretion to exclude such evidence when produced 8 days before trial, where judge felt it was
produced late under the guise of impeachment. Perry, 134 Idaho@ 53, 995 P.2d@ 823. Here
the defendant didn't produce the exhibits a few days before trial. Here the defense favored the
plaintiff side with the video at the end of trial, right before shooting it up on screen for the jury,
and the Professional License Board exhibits on the first day of trial testimony.

11.

Proper Evidence was Excluded. Two of Dr. Harper's exhibits, letters from Drs.

Gamer (Exhibit 33) and Beaver (Exhibit 42) and Katz, were excluded from evidence. Also,
letters from Drs. Katz, Shi and Beaver, and an email from Dr. Weinberg, were not allowed to be
used in cross-examining other medical experts. "An error in the exclusion of evidence requires
remand for a jury trial." Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459, 461, 111 P .3d 144, 146 (Idaho 2005).
Apparently, exclusion was a sanction for failure to provide them as exhibits. Both sides
submitted exhibits in advance of a prior trial date a year earlier, but neither party submitted new
exhibits prior to this September/October trial. Both letters were, however, produced in discovery

HARPER v. SEAMONS, APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF, Case# 38521

- 33

responses on December 13, 2009, and again on June 29, 2010. 29 So there was neither surprise
nor prejudice. And Dr. Harper's exhibit list over a year before listed medical records of Dr.
Katz, Dr. Shi and Dr. Beaver, Dr. Garner and Dr. Weinber, the expert authors of the letters.
The stated reason for excluding these vital exhibits was violation of the pretrial order.
But the Pretrial Order did not require production of exhibit qua exhibits. Paragraph 2(b) requires
service of a list of exhibits. 30 Paragraph 7 requires exhibits to be pre-marked brought to trial.
IRCP 16(f), (h) and (i) are the authority for such a ruling.

They allow sanctions, by

incorporating by reference IRCP 37 discovery sanctions.
Even if there were a violation, sanction for noncompliance with a pretrial order is
discretionary. McKim v. Horner, 143 Idaho 568,571, 149 P.3d 843, 846 (2006). Non-disclosure
does not warrant automatic exclusion. Milburn v. State was a civil case, in which the State
violated the pretrial order by failure to disclose any witnesses or produce any exhibits until long
after the designated date, 31 only days before trial. 135 Idaho 701, 705, 23 P.3d 775, 779 (Id.
App. 2000).
In [this] case, the district court conducted the required balancing of the equities.
Although the State was culpable and offered no excuse for the late disclosure, the district
court also found that Milburn was not prejudiced by the delay. Additionally, the court
indicated that the hearing could be postponed, should Milburn request it, as a
consequence of the State's late disclosure.
The record supports the district court's determination that the State's tardy disclosure did
not prejudice [the Plaintiff] .... In the circumstances presented here, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sanction the State's violation
of the pretrial order by excluding all of the State's evidence.
135 Idaho@ 706, 23 P.3d 779 (Id. App. 2000). The balancing of equities referred to is adapted
from Roe v. Doe (in which most of a party's exhibits were excluded for discovery violations).
29

Dr. Harper's Twelfth Supplemental Responses and Objections to Defendant's first Set ofRequests for Production
ofDocument. So the two exhibits were provided in discovery responses over 10 months before trial.
30
Amended Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial, dated November 3, 2009, Hon. Richard Greenwood. A
copy of Judge Greenwood's Order is attached as Exhibit D to the Affidavit supporting the present motion.
31
Here, as noted, the exhibits were provided as supplements to discovery months earlier, and they fell within the
description of the witness lists (medical records of the respective physicians).
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We conclude that ... when the sanction is something less than entry of judgment against
the offending party, some balancing of the equities and some consideration of the
efficacy of lesser sanctions must precede a trial court's imposition of a sanction which
will significantly impair a party's ability to present its case on the merits at trial. ...
[W]e hold that a trial court, 'must balance the equities by comparing the culpability of
the disobedient party with the resulting prejudice to the innocent party.' [cite omitted].
Second, a trial court should not impose a sanction that will prevent full adjudication of a
case on the merits without having first considered lesser sanctions and having reached a
conclusion, supported by the record, that lesser sanctions would be ineffective or
inadequate .... Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not act
within the boundaries of its discretion or consistently with applicable legal standards,
when it imposed a sanction that effectively deprived Roe of a full opportunity to oppose
the evidence against him ....
129 Idaho 663,668,931 P.2d 657,662 (Id. App. 1996), reh. den. 2001, rev. den. 2001. 32
On November 3, 2009 the Honorable Richard D. Greenwood issued an Amended Order
Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial.

Although both sides had submitted exhibits in advance of a prior trial date many months
earlier, it appears that neither party submitted to the other new exhibits lists prior to this
September/October trial. At least two 33 exhibits offered on plaintiffs behalf, a letter from Dr.
Beaver and a letter from Dr. Gamer, were excluded from evidence on the basis of failure to
produce them as part of exhibit production. See redaction from Trial Exhibit 52. Both were,
however, produced in response to discovery (a fact that was eventually admitted by defense
counsel at trial).
Dr. Beaver's letter., dated May 6, 2009, and July 20, 2009, 233 produced by Mr. Harper,
when he was representing himself in the case, on December 13, 2009. It was again produced as
part of Plaint~ff's Twe{fth Supplemental Responses and Objections to Defendant's first Set of
Requests for Production of Documents on June 29, 2010

It was bates stamped 810011.

32

It is error to exclude a witness solely on the basis of late or nondisclosure, if there is no showing of prejudice.
State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259,233 P.3d 190, 196 (Id. App. 2010) (error found harmless there, however).
33
There were other exhibits excluded by the Court, and one or more may have been for the same reason. By
mentioning these two key letters, defendant does not waive the argument as to others excluded.
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Although it was produced 9 months before trial, the letter was not allowed into evidence as an
apparent sanction for failure to produce documents timely.
The April 30, 2009 letter from Dr. Bradley Katz was produced by Mr. Harper, when he
was representing himself in the case, on December 13, 2009. It was again produced as part of
Plaint({f's Tweljth Supplemental Responses and Objections to Defendant's first Set of Requests
for Production ofDocuments, on June 29, 2010. It was bates stamped 810031.
The letters were vitally important to plaintiffs case.

They both represent recent

reiterations of these treating physicians as to plaintiffs condition and causation.

Dr. Katz

testified by video deposition, and the letters were later than the deposition. 34 They reaffinned
and to an extent rehabilitated the opinions which defense counsel had some success in
challenging on cross examination on the video. Causation was also reaffirmed. The April 30,
2009 rejected letter from Dr. Katz was in exhibit 52a. Also excluded from use was a letter from
Neurologist Martha Cline and a letter from Dr. Harper's general practitioner, Dr. Gregory Lewer.
They may have included a June 30, 2010 letter from Dr. vVeinberg, concurring with Dr. Katz, AS
Well as the April 14, 20071355534 Of neuropsychologist Douglas Smith.

See, Appendix A.

Along a similar vein, Dr Harper was unable use in evidence or as aids to cross examine
experts who testified, certain other expert letters. Some or all were included in a document
called 52a, Redactions from Exhibit 52. It is difficult from the court's Record to determine what
documents were included in Exhibit 52, which were admitted, and those which were part of 52a,
which were not. To the extent plaintiff should so move, it is hereby moved and requested that
the health care provider letters in Appendix A hereto, as exhibits which were offered and rejected
by the district court, and should have been marked and listed on the Exhibit List under Plaintiffs
52a.
34

Another Dr. Katz letter, dated April 30, 2009, was admitted as part of Exhibit 52.
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In fairness, Judge Goff stated in his Order denying JNOV, new trial, etc. that the letters
contained hearsay. Since Dr. Harper is unable to afford a transcript of trial, it is difficult to
determine whether that was an additional reason stated for exclusion. However, records from all
of those doctors were admitted, and all of them testified, either live or by videotape.

CONCLUSION

Judge Goff should have granted Dr. Harper a judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict,
a new trial, or additur. 35 The verdict was internally inconsistent and invalid on its face. It was
against the great weight of the evidence, and indicated passion or prejudice.

If Dr. Harper

suffered any injury from the April 2004 collision (which the jury held he did), the verdict is dead
wrong.
The admission of prejudicial, undisclosed exhibits (rife with religious content), and the
exclusion of 2 letters of Dr. Harper's doctors, which were timely disclosed, also provide
independent and sufficient reason for a new trial. Further, the video exhibit shows on the exhibit
list not to have been admitted, and yet it was played to the jury. No copy or other format was
preserved. The double standard of free admitting defendant's late produced exhibits, which are
more prejudicial than probative, yet excluding documents offered on behalf of Dr. Harper, with
adequate notice is palpable.
Since a new trial would mean a Jury still decides the case, but after a more fair
proceeding, both sides' rights would be protected.
The trial court should have granted Dr. Harper's Motion for a waiver of the transcript
costs on appeal.

He also requests an award of his costs in this appeal assessed against the

Appellee.
35

As mentioned above, the additur suggested is an increase of economic damages by $13,900 to $67,900, and
$15,000 noneconomic damages.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Dr. Harper requests a new trial, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, additur and a
reversal and remand for a new, fair trial. He also requests his costs on appeal, and requests that,
in the alternative, the cost of his transcripts be ordered paid by Ada County, to permit further
briefing on appeal, with additional citation to the Record.

Respectfully submitted this Iih day of September, 2011.

Mitchell R. Barker
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 12 th day of September, 2011, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by email sent to defendant's attorney, at the
following address:
Rodney Saetrum
Ryan B. Peck
Saetrum Law Offices
380 South 4th Street
P.O. Box 7425
Boise, Idaho 83707

Mitchell R. Barker
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APPENDIX A

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and 59.1

Idaho Code 31-3220
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Rule 59(a). New trial - Amendment of judgment - Grounds.
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all
or part of the issues in an action for any of the following
reasons:
1.
Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse
party or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which
either party was prevented from having a fair trial.
2.

Misconduct of the jury.

3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
4.
Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the
application, which the party could not, with reasonable diligence,
have discovered and produced at the trial.
5.
Excessive damages or inadequate damages, appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
6.
Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other
decision, or that it is against the law.
7.
Error in law, occurring at the trial. Any motion for a new
trial based upon any of the grounds set forth in subdivisions 1, 2,
3 or 4 must be accompanied by an affidavit stating in detail the
facts relied upon in support of such motion for a new trial. Any
motion based on subdivisions 6 or 7 must set forth the factual
grounds therefor with particularity. On a motion for new trial in
an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if
one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of
fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions,
and direct the entry of a new judgment.
(Amended March 20, 1985, effective July 1, 1985.)
Rule 59(b). Time for motion for new trial.
A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than fourteen
(14) days after the entry of the judgment.
(Amended June 15, 1987, effective November 1, 1987.)
Rule 59(c). Time for serving affidavits on motion for new trial.
When a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall
be served with the motion. The opposing party has fourteen (14)
days after such service within which to serve opposing affidavits,
which period may be extended for an additional period not exceeding
twenty one (21) days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply
affidavits.
(Amended June 15, 1987, effective November 1, 1987.)

Rule 59(d). On initiative of court.
Not later than fourteen (14) days after entry of judgment the court
of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for
which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party. The
court may grant a motion for a new trial, timely served, for a
reason not stated in the motion. In either case, such order shall
be made only after giving the parties notice and an opportunity to
be heard on the matter, and the court shall specify in the order
the grounds therefor.
(Amended ~une 15, 1987, effective November 1, 1987.)
Rule 59(e). Motion to alter or amend a judgment.
A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later
than fourteen (14) days after entry of the judgment.
(Amended June 15, 1987, effective November 1, 1987.)
Rule 59.1. Additurs or remittiturs in lieu of new trial.
(al
Acceptance or rejection. If a trial court conditionally grants
or denies a new trial subject to either an additur er remittitur,
the party to whom it is directed shall have 42 days from ent~y of
the order in which to accept or reject the same. If such party
files a notice of appeal, the appeal shall not constitute an
acceptance nor rejection of the additur or remittitur and such
party shall not be required to accept or reject the additur or
remittitur until the determination of the appeal.
(b)
Effect of appeal. If a party to whom an additur or remittitur
is directed is successful on appeal, the case shall thereafter be
processed as provided in the opinion determining the appeal. If the
order of the trial court granting a conditional new trial is
affirmed, the party to whom the additur or remittitur was directed
shall have fourteen (14) days from the date cf issuance of the
appellate remittitur in which to accept or reject the additur or
remittitur in a manner consistent with the appellate opinion.
(Adopted June 15, 1987, effective November 1, 1987.)

Idaho Statutes
TITLE 31
COUNTIES AND COUNTY LAW
CHAPTER 32
FEES
AFFIDAVIT. (:) For
31 3220. INABILITY TO PAY FEES
DEFINITIONS
purposes of this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(a)
"Action" means any civil suit, action, proceeding or appeal of
any such action, including a habeas corpus action, but excluding
proceedings brought pursuant to ~u.!J,<...l..liii..=.......;...,._L_...............,~-----=~' Idaho Code.
(b)
"Court" means the district court (including its magistrates
di vision), the court of appeals of Idaho or the supreme court of
Idaho.
( c)
"Frivolous" means a claim which has no arguable basis in law or
fact, or is substantially similar to a previous claim that has been
dismissed with prejudice or is barred by res judicata or collateral
estoppel.
( d)
"Indigent" means a person who is not a prisoner, as defined in
section 31-3220A, Idaho Code, and who is found by the court to be
unable to pay fees, costs or give security for the purpose of
prepayment of fees, costs or security in a civil action.
(e)
"Malicious" means a claim which appears to be intended solely to
harass the party.
(2)
The court may authorize the commencement or defense of any
action without prepayment of fees, costs or security, by any indigent
person not a prisoner, providing:
(a)
The person files an affidavit that he is indigent as provided in
subsection (3) of this section, and unable to pay fees, costs or give
security; and
(b)
The court finds, after informal inquiry, that the person is
indigent for the purpose of prepayment of fees, costs or security.
(3)
The affidavit shall contain complete information as to:
(a)
The person's identity;
(b)
The nature and amount of his income;
(c)
His spouse's income;
(d)
The real and personal property owned;
(e)
His cash or checking accounts;
(f)
His dependents;
(g)
His debts;
(h)
His monthly expenses;
(i)
The nature of the action;
(j)
The affiant's belief that he is entitled to redress.
The affidavit shall also contain the following statements: "I am unable
to pay the court costs. I verify that the statements made in this
affidavit are true and correct." The affidavit shall be sworn as required
by law.
(4)
No fees, costs or security shall be waived at the commencement
of an action if the court finds and certifies in writing that the action
is frivolous, malicious or otherwise not taken in good faith.
(5}
Upon the filing of an affidavit as set forth in this section and
a finding that the person is indigent, the court may direct that the

expense of printing the record
or transcr
for use on appeal be
paid out of the district court fund of the county in which the action was
filed.
(6)
The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and
perform all duties in cases in which the person is found by the court to
be indigent. Witnesses shall attend as in other cases, and the sane
remedies shall be available in other civil cases. ?aynent of fees for
service of process and witnesses, where
shall be paid out of
the district court fund of the
in which the action is filed.
(7)
The court may
for any fees, costs
or security which may have been waived in the action if the court finds
that any allegation contained in the affidavit of inability to pay fees
is untrue, or if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous or
malicious.
( 8)
Judgment nay be entered for
fees and costs at the
conclusion of the action as in other cases. If the cost of the transcript
or printed record has been
out of the district court fund for the
prevailing party, that party may be taxed in favor of the district court
fund.
The Idaho Code is made available on the Internet by the Idaho Legislature as a public senice. This Internet version of the
Idaho Code may not he used for commercial purposes, nor may this database be published or repackaged for commercial sale
without express written permission.

The Idaho Code is the property of the state of Idaho, and is copyrighted by Idaho law, J.C. § 9-352.
According to Idaho law, any person who reproduces or distributes the Idaho Code for commercial
purposes in violation of the provisions of this statute shall be deemed to be an infringer of the state of
Idaho's copyright.
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April 14, 2007

Rev. Anthony Harper, Ph.D.

P.O. Box 1829
Boise, ID 83701

DOI: 4/2/04

Dear Dr. Harper:
I am writing this Jetter to document for you the sequelae of your motor vehicle accident of
Apri I 2r 2004. Your diagnoses, using the IDC-9-CM, fall into three categories as I outlined

in my letter to you of October 16, 2005:
1.

310.2 Post-concussion syndrome.

2.
3.

847.0 Cervical strain.
924.9 Contusion, unspecified site.

The post-concussion syndrome has not resolved as I had expected. At this time1 your
symptoms and findings are expected to remain indefinitely. The following symptoms are
part of your post-concussion syndrome:
Fatigue; impaired stamina.
Impaired balance.

Cognitive and affective changes (see Dr. Beaver 1 s reports).
LefHided weakness, obvious in the left face.
Left-sided hypalgesia, obvious 1n the thumb.
Hyperacusis (see the OHSU reports).
Voice Impairment (see the OHSU reports).
Migraine (see the Moran Eye Institute reports).
Mild convergence insufficiency (see the Moran Eye Institute reports).

The cervical strain continues with neck and arm pain,
The contusion was of the 4th lumbar vertebra, with nuclear bone scan changes and
persistent pain.
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Ltr, .to Rev. Anthony Harpsr, Ph.D.
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Simple functional tolerances include
a working tolerance of approximately 45 minutes, and
a wafking tolerance of approximately 1 1/2 miles.

Cordially,

DES/egs
cc:

Gregory Lewer, M.D.
Stuart W. Carty, Attorney at Law
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Imaging Review:

(dates are day-month-year format)

07-10-2005
14-09-2005

14-09-2005

14-09-2005

14--09-2005
25-07-2005

25-07-2005

02-07-2005

28-10-2004

28-10-2004

22-10-2004

13-10-2004

Nuclear bone scan. Findings:
Increased uptake at the superior aspect of the L4 vertebral body.
MR scan of the temporal bones and brain and functional brain MRI.
(Functional Brain MRI at OHSU). Findings:
Frontal curvilinear venous angioma.
Few frontal subcortical sulci of nonspecific high T2/FLAIR signal
in the white matter.
CT head (at OHSU). Findings:
Right Frontal developmental venous anomaly.
Scattered minimal ethmoid mucosa! thickening.
CT cervical spine (at OHSU). Findings:
Mild degenerative disc disease and facet arthropathy.
Mild right foraminal narrowing at C4-5.
CT temporal bone (at OHSU). Findings:
Right frontal developmental venous anomaly.
X-rays lateral views of the lumbar spine in flexion and extension (at St.
Alphonsus). Findings:
Normal.
X-rays lateral views of the cervical spine in flexion and extension (at
St Alphonsus). Findings:
Degenerative atlantoaxial articulation changes.
No focal translation at any level.
MRI lumbar spine without contrast (at MRI Center of Idaho). Findings:
Degenerative disc disease at L2-3 through LS-S 1.
Edema and/or contusion at the L4 vertebral body,
Slight lateral recess narrowing at LS-51.
MRI thoracic spine (at MRI Center of Idaho). Findings:
Mild dextroscoliosis.
Old mild superior end plate compression deformity of T7.
MRI cervical spine (at MRI Center of Idaho). Findings:
1 to 2 mm. retrolisthesis of C4 on CS.
Spondylitic changes.
Foraminal narrowing right C4-5 and right CS-6.
X-ray cervical spine series (at St. Alphonsus). Findings:
Disc space narrowing C4-S with osteophytes.
Mild right foraminal narrowing C4-5 and C5~6 secondary to
osteophytes.
Upper cervical scoliosis concave to the left.
MRI screening of cervical and thoracic spine without a.nd with contrast
(at MRI Center of Idaho). Findings:
Minimal retrolisthesis of C4 on CS.
Mild spondylitic changes.
Old compression deformity of the T7 vertebral body.
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Page Two

Re: Rev. Anthony Harper, Ph.D.

Imaging review

06/10/2004

Brain MRI (at MRI Center of Idaho). Findings:

Right frontal venous anomaly.
10/09/2004

15-06-2004

Mucosa! sinus disease.
Smal I maxillary sinus retention cyst.
CT sinuses (at IMI). Findings:
Post-surgical changes of bilateral undnectomies and anterior
eth moidectomies.
Inflammatory changes.

Mild septa! deviation.
MRI lumbar spine (at IMI). Findings:
Spondylitic changes at L4-5 with minimal left lateral recess
stenos is and with minimal potential mass effect on the LS nerve

root.
LS-S 1 minimal right lateral recess stenosis with minimal potential
mass effect on the S1 nerve root.

05/08
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Studies:
25-02-2005
10--01-2005

Audiogram,
EMG/NCV studies (Dr. K. Krafft). Findings:
Normal.

PAGE

05/08

04/18/2007

10:25

2083441331

IDAHO t·1EUROLOGICAL

PAGE

Medical Professionals:

04-04-2007

01-02-2007

30-01-2007

18-12-2006
01-12-2006
15-09-2005

Dr. Baker Shi at OHSU.
Tinnitus. Sensorineural hearing loss. Post-concussion syndrome.
Recommended sound therapy, Xanax, and ear protection.
Dr. Weinberg at Moran Eye Center at the University of Utah.
Lateral canthoplasty recommended. Treatment for dry eyes
recommended.
Dr. Katz at Moran Eye Center at the Univet'sity of Utah.
"Transformed persistent migraine'', tinted glasses recommended.
Dry eye.
Mild
Blepharitis. Left lower eyelid ectropion.
convergence insufficiency.
Craig W. Beaver, Ph.D.
Follow-up consultation.

Jason Fronk, O.D.
Corneal irritation and left facial weakness.
Yong-Bing Shi, M.D. (OHSU).
Letter to Dr. Lewer.

Clinic note.
Symptoms:
Tinnitus and sound sensitivity;
Disturbed Sleep.

mild

dizziness.

Deteriorated memory.
Deteriorated concentration and focus.
Voice issues with singing higher pitches.
Findings:
Muscle tension as evidenced by anterior/posterior
compression when attempting high notes.

Recommendations:
Singing teacher or speech pathologist.
Sound therapy/desensitization.

14-09-2005

Yong-Bing

15-09-2005

Yong-Bing

Shi, M.D. (OHSU}.

Tinnitus clinic note.

15-09-2005

Shi, M.D. (OHSU).

Voice clinic note.
He feels that the voice issue is mostly a functional one.
Karen Murray, M.A., C.C.C. (OHSU).
Recommendation:
Singing voice

20-09-2005

lessons.

Tinnitus clinic summary note (OHSU).
Rec om mendati ons:
Two custom made musician's earplugs with 15 dB filters.
Two custom made in the ear sound generators.

Sound machine.
Sound pillow.
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Medical Professionals

15-03-2005

Martha Cline, M.D.
Continued posttraumatic headaches and posttraumatic cervical
strain.

21-10-2004
19-07-2005
06-06-2005

Tinnitus,
Martha Cline 1 M.D.
Gregory S. Lewer, M.D.
Esophagitis; reflux; closed head injury.
Craig Beaver, Ph.D.
Neuropsychological report:
Page 7:
"he was quite verbally disfluent".
Page 8:
he completed the Beck Anxiety lnventoiy ~
"he scored in the moderate range of

Page 8:

anxiousness 11 •
"he was not comfortable completing the

MMP1-2".
11 ~05-2005

05-05-2005

Gregory S. Lewer, M.D.
Tinnitus.
Left knee pain.
Carl Wurster, M.D.

Cannot read because of headaches.
14..04-2005

14-04-2005

11-03..05

Referred to Dr. Lawrence Anderson.
Gregory S. Lewer, M.D.
Distal femoral cortical defect.
Tinnitus.
Hyperacusis.
ENG report.
Nonspecific.
Gregory S. Lewer, M.D.
Tinnftus

left knee pain.
Rhinitis.
Sore throat.
25-02-2005

Audiogram.

08/08
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07-24-'09 10:13 FROM-

Craig W. Beaver, Ph.D. , ABPP - CN
Licensed Psydaologist

:250 Bobwhite Court, Suite 220 • Boise, Idaho 83706 • (208) 336.-2972 • Fax (208) 336-4408
Malling Address: P.O. Box 5445 • Boise, Idaho 83705

July 20, 2009

Re:

Reverend Anthony Harper, Ph.D.
P.O. Box 1829
Boise, Idaho 83701

DOB:
DOI: 4/2/04

To Whom It May Concern:
Dr. Anthony Harper was involved in a motor vehicle accident on 4/2/04 in which he
suffered a number of injuries. I have been involved with his care and treatment since
June, 2005. This has included administration of two neuropsychological test batteries;
the first in June, 2005 and the second examination in May, 2008. He has reported both
physical and cognitive changes related to that event. I have also reviewed many
records.
Most recently I had the opportunity to review a letter from Dr. Eric Ga,ner, ENT. l also
reviewed the results from a 3T MRI brain scan completed on 6/24/09 at Oregon Health
Science University. I reviewed statements from Dr. Mary Ransom, Neurologist at OHSU.
Additionally, I also reviewed a summary statement from Mary Harper, Anthony Harper's
wife regarding events and presentation of Mr. Harper before and after the April 2, 2004
automobile accident.
Since my examination in 2008 of Anthony Harper, I have had the opportunity to review
additional information. I wrote a letter on May 6, 2009 which summarized some of that
additional information regarding what difficulties Mr. Harper had following the motor
vehicle accident in April, 2004.
The additional information I reviewed from Dr. Garner, Dr. Ransom, the MRI completed
on 6/24/09 and the narrative information provided by Mrs. Harper all have provided
additional support regarding several issues. First, the information continues to indicate
Anthony Harper suffered injuries in the motor vehicle accident on 4/2/04. There also
continues to be evidence he did indeed suffer sufficient insult to result in a mild
traumatic brain injury with post-concussive syndrome. The results from his recent MRI,

Diplomate in Clinical Neuropsycbology, American Board of Professional Psychology
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07-24-'09 10:13 FROM-

RE: Reverend Anthony Harper, Ph.O.

July 20, 2009

Pagel

the information summarized and provided by the ENT, as well as the additional
descriptions provided by his wife in their narrative, all are indicative of someone who
suffered a mild TBI with post-concussive syndrome following the motor vehicle accident
in April, 2004. The descriptions Anthony Harper provides strongly suggest his current
difficulties are related to the April, 2004 accident. The most recent medical findings
continue to be consistent with this hypothesis.
Sincerely,

Craig W. B

/)). ~-.:JR. D

r, PhD, ABPP

1

Diplomate m Clinical Neuropsychology

CWB:je

cc:

Greg lewer, MD (fax# 367-7204}
Rev. Anthony Harper, Ph.D. (fax 1#248-0808)

..

05/06/2009 14:55 FAX 801 581 3357

MORAN EYE CENTER

'4]002

Bradley J. Katz, MD, PhD

Department of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences
Associate Professor
John Moran Eye Center
65 Mario Capecchi Dr

Salt Lake City, UT 84132
(801) 581-2352 • FAX: (801) 581-3357

April 30, 2009

Joseph Brown, MD
Fax: 208-4 75-4193

RE: ANTHONY HARPER
JN',EC: 204619

UMRN: 17202599
DOB:
To Whom It May Concern,

The purpose of this letter is to further clarify my impressions ofinjuries and eye problems sustained by Dr.
l Iarper as a result of his 2004 auto collision.
1) It is my impression that Dr. Harper's left facial nerve injury is peripheral rather than central.
2) It is my impression that Dr. Harper's facial nerve injury is a result of blunt trauma from his 2004
auto collision.

3) It is my impression that his facial nerve injury is not a result of whiplash from his 2004 auto
collision.
4) It is not my impression that Dr. Harper's facial nerve injury was a result of "shaking or his brain
inside his skull" from his 2004 auto collision.
5) There has been nothing in my interviews, examinations, or review of previous records for Dr.
Harper for me to suspect that his facial nerve damage is a result of previous accidents, preexisting
medical conditions, or other disease processes other Lhan his 2004 auto collision.
6) The only eye disease process that I have noted in Dr. Harper to he associated with his motor vehicle
accident is a left lower lid ectropion that was repaired surgically.
Yours sincerely,

Dictated but not read in order to expedite delivery - electronic signature.
Bradley J_ Kar.z, MD, PhD
Associate Professor
BJK:sj D: 04/30/2009
cc:

T: 04/30/2009 l l :32:46

Rev. Anthony Harper. PhD

Fax: 208-248-0808

Bradley J. Katz, MO, PhD
Department of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences
Associate Professor
John Moran Eye Center
65 Mario Capecchi Dr
Saft lake City, UT 84132
(801) 581-2352 t FAX: (801) 581-3357

November 18, 2008
Anthony Hruper

PO Box 1829
Boise, ID 83701
RE: ANTHONY HARPER
JMEC: 2046 l 9
UMRN: 17202599
DOB:

To Whom It May Concern,
It has recently come to my attention that Dr. Harper has been unable to receive help from the at-fault
insurance company to pay for his medical bills without an endorsement letter from me. After reviewing Dr.
Harper's chart, all of my previous correspondence, and Dr. Harper's most recent clinical exam, it is my
conclusion that Dr. Harper suffered a mild facial nerve (VU nerve) injury on the left side of his face as a
result of the automobile accident in April of 2004. Dr. Harper's migraine predisposition superimposed on
the mild head injury he suffered likely account for his reported light sensitivity. His convergence
insufficiency is also a common sequelae of mild traumatic head injuries.
It is firmly my belief that the oculoplastic procedure that Dr. Harper underwent in February of 2007 was a
direct result of his facial nerve injury and his automobile accident Correspondence from Dr. David
Weinberg, the surgeon who perfonned the surgery, also supports my contention that his left lower eyelid
ectropion was a result of automobile accident and required surgical repair to improve his eye pain, light
sensitivity, and ocular irritation. Please contact me if you need further clarification or evidence to support
this claim. Thanks so much for any help you can extend to Dr. Harper.
Yours sincerely,
I personally interviewed and examined this patient and discussed my findings and
recommendations with the patient

Dictated but not read in order to expedite delivery - electronic signature.
Bradley J. Katz, MD, PhD

Associate Professor
BJK:sj D: 11/18/2008

T: I l /25/2008 10:09:31

cc: Gregory Lewer, MD
10255 Overland Rd
Boise, JD 83709

CONCORD

EYE -CARE
VISIONARY MEDICINE .

Peter Wasserman, M;O,
Cdmprehensiva Ophthalmology
Cat:aract/Glaucoma
DialJetld Eyti Diseaso·

June 30, 2010

Mark A. Szal,-M;O.
CoriiprehP,nsive Ophtt,almofogy
CatarecVGlau!=oma
Diabetic Eye Disease

Christie L- Morse, M;D.
Pediatric Ophthalmology
Adult Strl4bismus

Bradfc:il'd S. Hall, M.O.
Comprehensive Ophtnalmology

c ·at.aract/Gfaucome.
Diabetic .eyP. Diseas~

Re:

Anthony Harper

DOBl/6/52 .
To Whom It May Concern:

I have'reviewed the letters of Bradley Katz, liiID dated April 30,
2009 .and November 18, 2008 and agree vii.th his statements and
impressions as stated-in those letters.

Eliot D. Fol~y, M.O.
Vitreoratinal 0/seaSGS
and Surge!'ll'

Jan1es M, Goldman, M.D.
Cornea, Catem.1ct
1.a~0r Vision Specialist

David A. Weinberg, M.O.
<;)culofaoiat r1astic Surgery

Maynard 13;Whee1er;M~D.
Pedi.<rt~c Ophthalmology
Adult $trablsmu:i

Jacqueline Llpsy, O.D.
Genr:irnl OptomP.try
Corit~c\ Lenses·

isabel Alonso, O.D.
·General Optometry
Cont.~~ Lensos

248 Pleasant Street
On Concord Hospital Campus
.Suite 1600
Concord, NH 03301
603-224-2020

1 -800-557-5100

Fax 603-228-0246 .

;FACS

L-e+

----- -I
S:)'JTHWF..::,r

:0~\HO

900 N. Liberty 51te8t, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83704
(208} 367-3320 • Fax (208) 367-7474

Otolaryngology!Head and Neck Surgery

Jill C Beck. M.D., F.A.C.S.
Erk T. Gamer, M.D.

Arthur C. Jones Ill, M.D., F.A.C.S.

Audiology
S. Dean Harmer, rh.D
Spencer Chee.hire, Au.D
Shalise Adams, Au.D

Jonathan M. Owffls, MD.
Todd J. Ru:;tad, M.D.
Matt~ 13. Schwarz, M.O.
Ryan Van De Graaff, MD.

June 22, 2009

RE:

Rev. Anthony Harper, Ph.D.
P. 0. Box 1829

Boise, ID 83701
OOB: January 6, l 952
001: April 2, 2004
To Whom II May Concern:

Dr. Harper suffered a moror vehicle accident on April 2. 2004 which caused multiple sequeUae from
which he still suffers. These include posl-roncuimioo syndrome, cervical strain, cerebral COJitusion which
result in fatigue and impaired stamina. impain:d balance secondary to vestibular contusion, COSDitive and
afkdive changes, left-sided weakness. left-sided bypalgesia. hyperacusis, voice impairment, migraines.
and mild convergence insufficiency of his vision. Alsio the cervical strain persists with neck and arm
pain. He has also sought evaluation from this office fur filciaJ as)'mmctry. This facial Mymmetry
consists of right inferior lid muscle hypertrophy that is exacerbated by his near constant squinting
secondary to !tis light sensitivity on I.be right side. H~ has bad previous left-sided oouloplastru !M.!Tgery for
left lower lid ectropion.

ll is my opinion that an asymmetry of the face would bi!lSt be addressed by the oculoplastic..-i group in Salt
Lake City. it is also my opinion that aU of the above mentioned medical issues are consequence ofhis
2004 auto collision.
Cordially,

Eric T. Gamer, M.O.

000517
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drharper
From:
"david weinberg" <daweinberg@hotmail.com>
To:
<drharper@afo.net>
Sent:
Monday, June 28, 2010 8:31 PM
Subject:
RE: from Dr. Harper on legal deadline - need help
I concur with Dr. Katz's impressions, but I'm not sure that I can be of any further assistance
to you.

Best wishes,
David
David A. Weinberg, MD, FACS

THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED FOR THE USE OF THE PERSON TO WHOM IT IS ADDRESSED.
IT MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS PRIVILEGED, CONFIDENTIAL AND EXEMPT FROM
DISCLOSURE UNDER APPLICABLE LAW. If you are not the intended recipient, your use of
this message for any purpose is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication
in error, please delete the message and notify the sender so that we may correct our
records.

> From: drharper@afo.net
> To: daweinberg@hotmail.com
> Subject: from Dr. Harper on legal deadline - need help
> Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2010 14:07: 15 -0500
>
> June 23, 2010
>
> David A. Weinberg, M.D.
> Concord Eye Care
> Pillsbury Building
> 248 Pleasant Street, Suite 1600
> Concord, New Hampshire 03301
> Phone (603) 224-2020
> Fax (603) 228-0248

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

Dear Dr. Weinberg,
As a Chaplain, I provide help to people in crisis and provide Substance
Abuse Education/Counseling and Anger Management Education/Counseling for
area Idaho courts.
There are two attached files being sent via this e-mail to you in PDF format
containing new medical evidence in my case. One of the pages in the file
includes a picture of the left side of my face drooping taken shortly after
my accident that Dr. Katz reviewed before his most recent letters dated
April 30, 2009 and November 18, 2008.
Since I am on a legal deadline facing a September 27 jury trial related to
my April 2, 2004 auto accident, please send me an e-mail if you are in
agreement with Dr. Katz' new letters enclosed by June 28.

6/28/2010
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>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

I appreciate you and thank you for your support.
Respectfully yours,

Rev. Anthony Harper, Ph.D.
P.O. Box 1829
ID 83701
Ph. {208) 703-8688
> Fax (208) 248-0808
> E-mail: drharper@afo.net

>
>
>
>
>

----------------------------------------Help protect your family and your marriage!
Take a look at PROTECTED internet service from
American Family Online - http://www.afo.net

6/28/2010

